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The polarisation between consistency, controls and the unscrutinised 
discretionary powers held by criminal justice agencies is a complex issue 
that transcends jurisdictions. In the Australian State of Victoria, this 
conflict is particularly evident in the prosecutor’s decision-making powers 
in the plea bargaining process, because these powers are not subject to 
scrutiny and the decisions made under them are not transparent. 
Furthermore, plea bargaining itself is a non-formalised and unscrutinised 
method of case resolution. While the use of discretion is an important 
component of prosecutorial work, it is the potentially individualised and 
idiosyncratic nature of unscrutinised discretionary decisions that results in 
plea bargaining and prosecutorial decision-making in Victoria giving rise 
to perceptions of inappropriateness and misconduct. Drawing upon the 
voices of Victorian and United Kingdom legal professionals, this article 
critically analyses the controls placed on United Kingdom prosecutors by 
the Attorney General’s Guidelines on the Acceptance of Pleas and the 
Prosecutor’s Role in the Sentencing Exercise 2009 (UK), and considers 
whether similar guidelines could be implemented in Victoria to redress 
problems surrounding the idiosyncratic nature of prosecutorial decision-
making in plea bargaining. By offering a unique insight into the 
perspectives of those involved in plea bargaining, this article explores the 
benefits of implementing a transparent and scrutinised control on 
prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining, and considers whether this 
would in turn offer greater safeguards, consistency and transparency of 
prosecutorial decision-making in Victoria.  
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I INTRODUCTION 
The tendency nowadays is to introduce more control rather than less, more 
control in every area. Like with victims, everything is automated by the 
Victims’ Charter [Act 2006 (Vic)] now…There are issues with discretion 
being exercised now. A discretionary decision is made and someone says 
why? So there is a focus on reducing discretion. There is scope there [to 
reduce discretion] but you need to have some, it just requires a bit of finesse 
that hasn’t been worked out yet … So there is a tendency to implement 
controls. Whether that is good or bad, I don’t know. (Prosecutor J)1
The polarisation between discretion and rules within the operation of criminal 
justice processes, and the resulting concerns surrounding the discretionary 
powers held by criminal justice agencies, have fuelled movements within 
Australia over the last 35 years — and since the late 1960s in the United 
States, United Kingdom (UK) and Canada — towards increasing the 
transparency of criminal justice processes and the conduct of those involved 
within them.
 
2 In particular, such reforms have sought to control and scrutinise 
the discretionary powers of criminal justice agencies on the basis that this will 
increase public confidence, offer transparency, and improve (perceptions of) 
equality within legal systems. This movement is particularly noticeable in the 
UK, where legislation and mandatory guidelines direct the actions of criminal 
justice agencies in almost all aspects of criminal proceedings.3
                                                 
1 Prosecutor J was a participant in the author’s three-year study examining the justifications for 
formalising Victorian plea bargaining practices. 
 The Attorney 
General’s Guidelines on the Acceptance of Pleas and the Prosecutor’s Role in 
the Sentencing Exercise 2009 (UK) (‘Guidelines’), a policy which regulates 
prosecutorial conduct in the plea bargaining process, provides an example of 
such developments, and highlights the strong public interest and transparent 
2 Katja Franko Aas, Sentencing in the Age of Information: From Faust to Macintosh 
(Glasshouse Press, 2005); Abraham S Blumberg, Criminal Justice (Quadrangle Books, 1967); 
Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Louisiana State 
University Press, 1969); David Dixon, Law in Policing: Legal Regulation and Police 
Practices (Clarendon Press, 1997); Oonagh E Fitzgerald, The Guilty Plea and Summary 
Justice: A Guide for Practitioners (Carswell, 1990); Robert A Kagan, ‘Regulators and 
Regulatory Processes’ in Austin Sarat (ed), The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society 
(Blackwell Publishing, 2004) 212; Cyrus Tata, ‘Transformation, Resistance, and Legitimacy: 
The Role of Pre-Sentence Reports in the Production (and Disruption) of Guilt and Guilty 
Pleas’ (Speech delivered at the European Society of Criminology Annual Conference, 
Edinburgh, Scotland, 2–5 September 2008) <http://staff.law.strath.ac.uk/staff/cyrus_tata/ 
public/Role%20of%20the%20SER%20in%20Facilitating%20Guilt%20ESC%20Webpaper%
20.pdf>. 
3 Aas, above n 2; Denis James Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official 
Discretion (Clarendon Press, 1986). 
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roles of UK prosecutors in the otherwise generally hidden processes of plea 
bargaining and prosecutorial decision-making.4
This article explores the UK Guidelines and considers whether a similar 
reform could be implemented in a comparable, common law system in the 
Australian State of Victoria. The article particularly focuses on issues of 
transparency, prosecutorial resource expenditure, the pressures that accused 
persons face to plead guilty, and the pressures that prosecutors endure to 
engage in plea bargaining discussions.
  
5
Drawing from the voices of Australian and UK legal professionals, this article 
identifies some of the main benefits of the Guidelines, particularly in regard to 
greater transparency and accountability of prosecutorial decision-making. 
However it also recognises their limitations in potentially encroaching upon 
judicial independence in sentencing and further expending prosecutorial 
resources. This article argues that implementing the Guidelines in Victoria 
would be beneficial in making transparent prosecutorial conduct in plea 
bargaining. Such transparency would minimise some limitations arising from 
the private nature of plea discussions, particularly in reducing the negative 
assumptions associated with prosecutorial motivations for entering into and 
 Aside from sharing a common law 
system of justice, both the Victorian and the UK justice systems are facing 
mounting pressures from an increase in criminal prosecutions, combined with 
a lack of sufficient resources and limited efficiency levels across all courts. 
The results of this have led to an (empirically perceived) rise in the use of 
early resolution mechanisms, particularly that of plea bargaining discussions 
between counsel to facilitate and encourage accused persons to make an early 
pleading decision. The approaches of the jurisdictions to holding prosecutors 
accountable for these decisions, however, have differed significantly, thus 
providing an interesting basis for a comparative analysis of the two systems. 
                                                 
4 John B Bishop, Prosecution Without Trial (Butterworths, 1989); Kerry Carrington and 
Russell Hogg, ‘Critical Criminologies: An Introduction’, in Kerry Carrington and Russell 
Hogg (eds), Critical Criminology: Issues, Debates, Challenges (Willan Publishing, 2002); 
John Jay Douglass, Ethical Issues in Prosecution (National College of District Attorneys, 
University of  Houston Law Center, 1988); Rowena Johns, ‘Victims of Crime: Plea Bargains, 
Compensation, Victim Impact Statements and Support Services’ (Briefing Paper No 10/02, 
NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service, June 2002) <http://www. 
parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/publications.nsf/0/578c6f10c6d98565ca256ecf00083b4
d/$FILE/10-02.pdf>; Mike McConville, Andrew Sanders and Roger Leng, The Case for the 
Prosecution: Police Suspects and the Construction of Criminality (Routledge, 1991). 
5 For the purpose of this article, only the sections of the Guidelines that are directly relevant to 
prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining — that is, the discussions between the 
prosecution and the defence practitioner(s) — are explored. 
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accepting plea deals.6
Providing a unique insight into the perspectives of Australian and United 
Kingdom legal professionals, and using a similar framework to that of Tata’s 
analysis of judicial craftwork within the UK,
 However, the article recommends against the full 
implementation of like guidelines, suggesting that this would further 
overburden and waste prosecutorial pre-trial preparation time, possibly hinder 
the occurrence of plea discussions, and potentially encroach upon judicial 
independence in sentencing.  
7 this article contends that the 
polarisation between discretion and rules is, at least to some extent, archaic. 
Thus, rather than being labelled as contradictory, discretion and control, or 
‘rules’, should work in conjunction with each other to increase perceptions of 
equality, transparency and accountability within criminal justice processes, 
particularly within the practice of plea bargaining.8
II METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW 
 This article thus contends 
that it is not the existence of prosecutorial discretion per se that is the key 
problem in Victorian plea bargaining practices; it is the potentially 
idiosyncratic nature of the discretionary decisions that requires addressing 
through the implementation of a more transparent and scrutinised control 
mechanism, such as the Guidelines. 
This article draws upon the findings of a three-year study which examined the 
informality of plea bargaining and prosecutorial decision-making in Victoria. 
Fifty-eight semi-structured interviews were conducted with 46 participants in 
2007, 2008 and 2009 in Victoria and London (n=11 defence [all Victorian]; 
n=23 prosecutors [n=15 Victorian, n=4 UK)] n=7 judiciary [all Victorian] 
and; n=5 advisors [n=2 Victorian, n=3 UK]). The interview data shed light on 
the perspectives of legal parties and advisors, including representatives from 
the Victorian State Office of Public Prosecutions (OPP), Melbourne 
metropolitan criminal courts, the Criminal Bar Association, Victoria Legal 
Aid, the Victorian Attorney-General’s Department, the UK Office of the 
Attorney General, the Crown Prosecutorial Service (CPS) and statutory bodies 
such as the Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council.  
                                                 
6 Douglass, above n 4; Johns, above n 4; Peter H Solomon, Criminal Justice Policy, from 
Research to Reform (Butterworths, 1983). 
7 Cyrus Tata, ‘Sentencing as Craftwork and the Binary Epistemologies of the Discretionary 
Decision Process’ (2007) 16(3) Social and Legal Studies 425, 429. 
8 Ibid. 
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The participants were representative of a range of experience and seniority, 
ranging from articled clerks (n=1), instructing or junior solicitors (n=6), 
Crown prosecutors and Program Managers (n=8), to education and 
development staff (n=4), Witness Assistance Service counsellors (n=2), Legal 
Aid solicitors and barristers (n=4), Queens and Senior Counsel (n=9), 
Magistrates (n=1), Judges (n=4) and Justices (n=2). In order to maintain 
confidentiality, participants are assigned pseudonyms based on their 
profession and are referred to as Prosecutor, Judiciary, Defence or Advisor, 
followed by a randomly assigned sequential letter: for example, Prosecutor A, 
Advisor C. To illustrate the geographical location of the participant, all UK 
participants have the abbreviation ‘UK’ cited in brackets.  
Semi-structured interviews were selected because they are positioned between 
the ordered technique of structured interviews and the flexible, free-flowing 
style of in-depth interviews. The questions were thus structured to allow for 
comparative analysis of responses, while still allowing sufficient flexibility 
for the interviewer to probe beyond the questions to seek elaboration and 
clarification.9 The participants were asked questions from one of two 
interview schedules, depending on their geographical location. Each schedule 
was divided into eleven topic areas, and combined direct and open-ended 
questions to encourage the expansion of personal opinions, while still 
allowing for a comparative analysis of responses.10
Of most importance in the context of this discussion, the UK participants were 
asked to comment on the benefits and limitations of the Guidelines, based on 
their direct engagement with them, and then consider their applicability to a 
Victorian jurisdiction. The Victorian participants were asked to comment on 
 The questions were also 
selected according to the professional role of the participant. Thus not all 
participants were asked every question on the interview schedule. 
Consequently, when participant responses are analysed, the number of 
participants who were asked the question is often cited in conjunction with the 
number of participants who supported or opposed the view. For example, 
although 23 prosecutorial participants were interviewed, the analysis may 
state that ten out of twelve prosecutorial participants supported a particular 
view, because only twelve prosecutors were asked to comment on this issue.  
                                                 
9 Fiona Devine and Sue Heath, Sociological Research Methods in Context (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1999); Irving Seidman, Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for 
Researchers in Education and the Social Sciences (Teachers College Press, 2nd ed, 1998). 
10 The eleven topic areas included: defining plea bargaining (in Victoria/in the United 
Kingdom); benefits of plea bargaining; limitations of plea bargaining; the pre-trial process; 
court inefficiency and delay; sentence leniency and sentence discounts; sentence indications; 
victims, their role and rights; accused persons, their role and rights; non-transparency in 
discretionary decisions and; law reform. 
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what they perceived to be the benefits and limitations of the Guidelines both 
as they operate in the UK, and as they would operate should they be 
implemented in Victoria. The interview data included descriptions of 
behaviour, institutions, court processes, appearances, actions, interactions, 
personal narratives and accounts. The emerging patterns of the Victorian and 
UK interviews were analysed in their own context, before being contrasted 
with the relevant literature and all interview data, thus allowing for the 
responses to be explored individually, collectively, and comparatively, 
according to the participant’s geographical location.  
Due to the lack of access and visibility surrounding plea bargaining processes 
(this includes the absence of any existing administrative data on plea 
bargaining in Victoria), the use of interviews offered a mechanism to 
understand how plea bargaining operates in the Victorian and UK 
jurisdictions from the perspectives of those directly involved. While an 
analysis of only the court and/or internal prosecution policies that direct legal 
conduct may have provided a potentially easier method of obtaining data for a 
researcher from outside the legal community, it would not have provided 
sufficient detail of how plea bargaining works in practice. Instead, the use of 
interviews allowed for the investigation of how individuals interpret plea 
bargaining policy, and offered a way to capture the variation between what 
should happen (for example, expressed in internal prosecution policy) and 
what actually happens in practice. The interview data thus allows this 
discussion to move from opinions and statements of law and policy to 
determinations of what happens in practice.  
It is important to note that the arguments in this article are informed largely by 
the perspectives of Victorian legal participants. However this does not reduce 
the relevance of the findings or the article’s comparative nature. While the 
smaller number of UK participants may mean that some aspects or intricacies 
of the operation of the UK criminal justice process may be overlooked, the 
strong focus on the interview data obtained from the UK participants, 
combined with the voices of the Australian legal participants, enables a 
unique analysis of the Guidelines. Furthermore, all participants were asked to 
reflect upon whether their views were indicative or representative of the 
group, agency and/or body they represented. Overwhelming, the participants 
believed that their views were reflective of those of their colleagues, and 
others within the legal field, and not necessarily from their specified group. 
For example, prosecutors considered that they were speaking on behalf of 
defence practitioners or members of the judiciary. Thus there is a basis for 
claiming that the voices represented in this article are reflective of a more 
general UK-based perspective. The potential limitation caused by the smaller 
number of UK participants is also compensated for by reference to wider 
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research findings within the field, particularly research examining the practice 
of discretion and plea bargaining in the UK.  
III CONTROLLING DISCRETION 
The rule of law is often equated with structure, control and consistency – the 
need to treat like cases in a similar fashion. Discretion however, is considered 
‘the freedom to break rules’;11 as Aas observes, ‘discretion is usually regarded 
as the opposite of rules and law … where, instead of deciding a question by 
recourse or fixed rule … there is no prescribed … course of action’.12 
Discretion is the ‘situation in which an official has latitude to make 
authoritative choices not necessarily specified within the source of authority 
which governs his decision making’.13
Discretion may therefore be described as ‘the antithesis of a decision taken in 
accordance with the rule of law’.
 In effect, then, it directly contrasts with 
the common law aims of consistency, certainty and equality, insofar as it 
allows for individual prejudices and biases to control aspects of proceedings.  
14
the dichotomy between discretion and rules is apparent in both the traditions 
of legal-rational scholarship and the new penology. Both traditions rely on 
an understanding…of two basic and competing ways: discretionary or 
ordered rules.
 As Tata explores in his critique of binary 
legal dichotomies in the UK context: 
15
In reference to judicial decision-making, Tata further observes that 
traditionally the division between discretion and structured rules has meant 
that such powers are understood as ‘either informal and thus essentially 
lacking in structure, arbitrary and capricious, or … [appropriately] governed 
by legal rules, principles and policies’.
  
16
                                                 
11 Albert Frederick Wilcox, The Decision to Prosecute (Butterworths, 1972) 112. 
 As a result of this conflict, stringent 
controls regulating discretion have emerged within criminal justice systems, 
these impacting largely on the discretionary powers of judicial officers and 
12 Aas, above n 2, 15. 
13 Burton Atkins and Mark Pogrebin, ‘Discretionary Decision-Making in the Administration of 
Justice’, in Burton Atkins and Mark Pogrebin (eds), The Invisible Justice System: Discretion 
and the Law (Anderson Publishing, 2nd edn, 1982) 3. 
14 Davis, above n 2, 25. 
15 Tata, above n 7, 429. 
16 Ibid. 
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prosecutors, with the justification that their public interest roles require 
control to give transparency and consistency to decisions.17
The move towards formally controlling discretion has arisen partially in 
response to a bureaucratic desire to improve accountability, and partially due 
to public perceptions that regulatory controls minimise abuses of power.
 
18 
Controlling discretion has also been supported on the basis that laws and 
formal restrictions are the framework of a ‘democratic’ justice system, 
offering consistency and uniformity.19 Monitoring discretion means all 
individuals are, at least in theory, treated under the same set of rules and 
receive like treatment.20 Controls have also emerged on the premise that it is 
usually the powerful and dominant classes who attain and gain from 
discretion, while the less powerful classes suffer.21
The behaviour of no-one in a position of authority can be excluded from 
another’s scrutiny… Decision makers should be allowed little other than the 
most minimal form of weak discretion … The more constraints in place to 
 Therefore, reform in areas 
where there is the potential for individual or institutional abuse is promoted. 
As Pinkele claims: 
                                                 
17 Aas, above n 2; Roger Cotterrell, ‘Law in Social Theory and Social Theory in the Study of 
Law’, in Austin Sarat (ed), The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society (Blackwell 
Publishing, 2004) 21; Davis, above n 2; Kagan, above n 2, 212; Main Street Criminal 
Procedure Committee, ‘Report on Backlog in Vancouver Adult Criminal Court’ (Report, 
Provincial Court of British Colombia, January 2005); Carl F Pinkele, ‘Discretion Fits 
Democracy: An Advocate’s Argument’, in Carl F Pinkele and William C Louthan (eds), 
Discretion, Justice and Democracy: A Public Policy Perspective (Iowa State University Press, 
1985); Elaine Samuel and Ian Clark, ‘Improving Practice: A Summary of Responses to the 
Consultation on the 2002 Review of the Practices and Procedure of the High Court of 
Justiciary’ (Scottish Executive Research Council, 2003) <http://www.scotcourts. 
gov.uk/bonomy/docs/ConsultationAnalysis.pdf>. 
18 Charles D Breitel, ‘Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement’ (1960) 27(3) University of 
Chicago Law Review 427; Cotterrell, above n 17, 21; Kagan, above n 2, 212; William C 
Louthan, ‘The Politics of Discretionary Justice Among Criminal Justice Agencies’ in Carl F 
Pinkele and William C Louthan (eds), Discretion, Justice and Democracy: A Public Policy 
Perspective (Iowa State University Press, 1985); Samuel Walker, Taming the System: The 
Control of Discretion in Criminal Justice 1950 – 1990 (Oxford University Press, 1993). 
19 Aas, above n 2; Pinkele, above n 17; Walker, above n 18. 
20 Aas, above n 2. 
21 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford University Press, 1990). For a 
broader discussion on the implications of discretionary decisions on minority communities, 
see Ben Bowling and Coretta Phillips, ‘Disproportionate and Discriminatory: Reviewing the 
Evidence on Police Stop and Search’ (2007) 70(6) Modern Law Review 936 and Darren Ellis, 
‘Stop and Search: Disproportionality, Discretion and Generalisations’ (2010) 83(3) Police 
Journal 199. 
2011 AUSTRALIAN AND UK PERSPECTIVES ON PLEA BARGAINING REFORM 369 
restrict discretionary administrative interpretation and implementation, the 
better off we are as democratic people.22
Accordingly, there has been a shift away from instinctive and intuitive 
judgments towards an expansion of policies, so that ‘written rules replace 
custom … and specialists administer the justice bureaucracy in accordance 
with written procedures and regulations’.
  
23
ensure that courts across England and Wales are consistent in their approach 
to sentencing … and to help judges and magistrates decide the appropriate 
sentence … and allow for greater transparency in sentencing … [by 
providing] a structured approach to determining the appropriate sentence.
 This has been achieved through 
the use of statutory and formal requirements, and the creation of oversight and 
advisory bodies, such as the Sentencing Advisory Council in Victoria, or the 
Sentencing Council in the UK. The role of the Sentencing Council specifically 
entails preparing and monitoring sentencing guidelines to 
24
Aas suggests that the role of the Sentencing Council (then the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council) extends to include control over the exercise of judicial 
discretion in order to make ‘decision-making more transparent and predictable 




This shift towards the control of discretion was also noted by participants 
from both the defence and prosecutor groups in the author’s research, who 
observed that criminal proceedings in Australia are becoming increasingly 
bureaucratised, with greater controls placed on discretion. Defence A 
observed that ‘it is the spirit of the times, the flavour of the month to formalise 
everything and control everything. Nothing is left to discretion, it is all 
regulation and structure’. Prosecutor E also maintained that ‘in all areas, 
prosecutors, defence [practitioners] and the courts are trusted less and less, 
and monitored and checked more and more’.  
 
                                                 
22 Pinkele, above n 17, 560. 
23 Louthan, above n 18, 15. 
24 United Kingdom Sentencing Council, Sentencing Guidelines (2010) <http://www. 
sentencingcouncil.org.uk/sentencing-guidelines.htm>. See also, Code for Crown Prosecutors 
2004 (UK); Code of Practice for Victims of Crime 2004 (UK); Farquharson Guidelines -The 
Role and Responsibility of the Prosecution Advocate 2002 (UK); Breach of Anti-Social 
Behaviour Order – Definitive Guideline 2008 (UK); Causing Death by Driving – Definitive 
Guideline 2008 (UK); Theft and Burglary in a Building other than a Dwelling – Definitive 
Guideline 2008 (UK). 
25 Aas, above n 2, 15. 
370 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 16 NO 2 
The implementation of legislative controls on the previously informal 
sentence indication hearings operating in Victoria’s Magistrates’ Court 
provides an example of this. Despite 30 participants claiming that this process 
operated effectively in its informal state, statutory guidance was enacted in 
July 2008 to formally dictate the required roles of those involved in summary 
sentence indication hearings, in order to provide transparency, consistency 
and control to the process.26 A further example can be seen in the recent 
changes in Western Australia, restricting the discretion of judges in 
sentencing cases where public officers, such as police members, paramedics 
or prison guards, are assaulted in the course of carrying out their professional 
duties. In such cases, discretion is restricted, as judicial officers must impose a 
minimum six-month jail term on adult offenders.27
IV COMPARING PLEA BARGAINING AND PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION: UK AND AUSTRALIA 
 
Prosecutors, in addition to possessing the discretionary powers to decide 
whether or not to proceed with a case, also have discretion to decide how to 
prosecute, with which offence(s) they will proceed, whether they will accept 
or make a plea bargain offer, and whether to dismiss charges, all of which 
occurs without significant judicial oversight or review. Krauss refers to this 
power as ‘prosecutorial adjudication’,28
Serves as the central adjudicator of facts (as well as replacing the judge as 
arbiter of most legal issues) …, evaluates culpability and chooses the charge 
for which he will accept a guilty plea … [and offers] an advisory sentencing 
guideline … [resulting in] the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
affect[ing] almost every step of the criminal justice process, from charging 
to sentencing.
 a process in which the prosecutor: 
29
Across western criminal jurisdictions, increases in the number of matters 
commencing each year has unsurprisingly led to prosecutors facing heavier 
  
                                                 
26 Asher Flynn, ‘Sentence Indications for Indictable Offences: Increasing Court Efficiency at 
the Expense of Justice? A Response to the Victorian Legislation’ (2009) 42(2) Australian and 
New Zealand Journal of Criminology 244; Sentencing Advisory Council, ‘Sentence 
Indication and Specified Sentence Discounts (Final Report, September 2007). See also, 
Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 61, formally governed by the Magistrates’ Court Act 
1989 (Vic) s 50A. 
27 Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 318 (4)(b). 
28 Rebecca Krauss, ‘The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and 
Development’ (2009) 6(1) Seton Hall Circuit Review 1, 8. 
29 Ibid. 
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workloads, often without the necessary resources to see every case through to 
trial.30
Plea bargaining is essentially a discussion between the prosecutor and the 
relevant defence practitioner regarding the accused person’s likely plea, the 
possibility of negotiating the charge(s) and/or case facts, and the Crown’s 
possible sentencing submission. The primary aim of discussions is to arrive at 
a mutually acceptable agreement, according to which the accused pleads 
guilty. This process is generally undertaken on the basis that it will enhance 
court efficiency by saving resource and financial expenditure, reduce court 
backlogs and prosecutorial workloads, and spare accused persons and victims 
prolonged proceedings. As Krauss observes: 
 As a consequence, the discretionary powers of the prosecutor to make 
and accept an offer that results in an accused pleading guilty without the need 
for a contested trial, in other words, a plea bargain, has taken on a more 
prominent and arguably more significant role in the delivery of modern 
justice.  
Today, plea-bargaining and prosecutorial discretion determine the outcome 
of the vast majority of criminal cases. The prosecutor evaluates evidence 
and determines culpability in a process that is governed by very few legal 
standards. In doing so he exercises broad discretionary powers … [which] 
would, in practice, be very difficult for a court to review.31
As a result, prosecutors have become what Bibas refers to as ‘the key 
gatekeepers who ration criminal justice’.
  
32
1 The United Kingdom 
 
Plea bargaining is not a new phenomenon in the UK, with research suggesting 
that it has been a longstanding mechanism used to advance early guilty pleas 
since, at least, the early 1960s. This is despite the comments of Lord Scarman 
in R v Atkinson33 that ‘plea bargaining has no place in the English criminal 
law’.34
                                                 
30 For a discussion of the impacts of limited resources on prosecutorial discretionary decision-
making in plea bargaining, see Asher Flynn and Kate Fitz-Gibbon, ‘The Honeymoon Killer: 
Plea Bargaining and Intimate Femicide – A Response to R v Watson’ (2010) 35(4) 
Alternative Law Journal 203. 
 The first significant guidance relating to plea bargaining, outside its 
31, Krauss, above n 28, 9. 
32 Stephanos Bibas, ‘The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion’ (2010) 19(2) Temple Political and 
Civil Rights Law Review 369. 
33 [1978] 1 WLR 425. 
34 R v Atkinson [1978] 1 WLR 425, 462. See also, John Baldwin and Mike McConville, 
Negotiated Justice: Pressures to Plead Guilty (Martin Robertson, 1977); Duncan Watson, 
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condemnation in Atkinson, was provided in R v Turner.35 However this case 
focused on the role of sentence indications, whereby a judge informs the 
accused or their representative of the possible sentence they would receive 
should a guilty plea be entered, as opposed to the plea discussions that occur 
between the prosecution and defence practitioner. It was not until the 2000s 
that controls restricting prosecutorial discretion in relation to charging 
decisions, the prosecutor’s role in the sentencing hearing, and in plea 
bargaining discussions, became more clearly defined, largely by the 
Guidelines. Further to these Guidelines, Watson also notes that a ‘cultural 
shift’ towards greater acceptance of plea bargaining and early guilty plea 
incentives emerged in 2005, following the decision of R v Goodyear.36 This 
case altered the previous guidelines established in Turner to allow accused 
persons to request an indication of the highest possible sentence type and 
range that could be imposed if they pleaded guilty.37
The Guidelines were initially introduced in December 2000, in accordance 
with the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) section 7, which outlined the 
importance of transparency in the administration of justice. Advisor A (UK) 
observed that this version of the Guidelines was also implemented in response 
to a publicised case of prosecutorial misconduct, which, he stated, resulted in 
the  
 
prosecutor becoming totally bound up in the sentencing proceedings, so 
much so that the Attorney General found that his hands were fettered when 
he wanted to refer the case for an unduly lenient sentence to the Court of 
Appeal.  
In 2003, a comprehensive review of the Guidelines was undertaken to reflect 
the shifting role of the prosecution within the criminal justice process and 
revised guidelines were implemented in 2005, ‘after about the fourteenth 
version was written’.38 In March 2009, the Guidelines were further amended 
to provide ‘specific guidance on … a uniform and workable procedure for 
plea negotiations between the prosecution and defence prior to trial’,39
                                                                                                                    
‘The Attorney General’s Guidelines on Plea Bargaining in Serious Fraud: Obtaining Guilty 
Pleas Fairly?’ (2010) 74(1) Journal of Criminal Law 77. 
 and 
35 [1970] 2 QB 321. 
36 [2005] EWCA Crim 888. 
37 Watson, above n 34, 85. 
38 Advisor C (UK). 
39 Watson, above n 34, 78. 
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also, according to Advisor C, to ‘provide additional control of a prosecutor’s 
discretion … beyond the limited scope of the original guidelines’.40
The Guidelines operate in conjunction with a number of other legislative and 
formal controls that regulate prosecutorial conduct and discretion in the UK, 
including the Farquharson Guidelines on the Role and Responsibility of the 
Prosecution Advocate 2002 (UK), which direct conduct within the 
prosecution process; the Code for Crown Prosecutors 2010 (UK), which 
controls conduct in relating to the laying of charges through to the Plea and 
Sentencing Hearing; the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime 2006 (UK), 
which outlines prosecutorial obligations to victims and is recognised in 
section 32 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (UK) ; and 
the Prosecutors’ Pledge 2005 (UK). The key aims of the Guidelines are to 
make legal conduct transparent, and to uphold public interests, which is very 
much in keeping with the breadth of these other controls. As Advisor A (UK) 
explained: 
 
Very much the driver of the Guidelines is you get the charge right, you get 
the acceptance of plea right and you play a part in the sentencing. Then you 
are, as a prosecutor, a more rounded individual. You’re influencing in terms 
of public interest and in the public good. 
Advisor D (UK) also maintained that a central aim of the Guidelines is to 
ensure that victims’ rights are seen to be considered within plea bargaining 
and sentencing processes, which aligns strongly with the victim-focused 
approach of the UK justice system.41 Both the UK Government and Office of 
the Attorney General have been prominent advocates for recognising victims’ 
rights in formal policies and legislation.42
The Guidelines are divided into five areas, outlining the required conduct and 
responsibilities of prosecutors in the acceptance of a plea bargain, and, where 
relevant, the responsibilities of judges and defence practitioners. Such 
responsibilities include identifying the main factors for consideration when 
deciding whether to plea bargain — for example, whether the plea bargain 
upholds public interests, establishes the severity of the offending behaviour, 
 
                                                 
40 See Appendix A for a copy of the Guidelines. 
41 See s A1, ss B3–B5. 
42 Crown Prosecution Service, Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (at 3 April 2006); Crown 
Prosecution Service, Code for Crown Prosecutors (at 22 February 2010); Domestic Violence, 
Crime and Victims Act 2004 (UK) s 32; Crown Prosecution Service, Prosecutor’s Pledge (at 
21 October 2005) 2, 3. See also, Joanna Shapland, Jon Willmore and Peter Duff, Victims in 
the Criminal Justice System (Gower, 1985); Heather Strang, Repair or Revenge: Victims and 
Restorative Justice (Clarendon Press, 2002). 
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reflects the victim’s physical and/or emotional injuries, and demonstrates the 
crime’s impact on the community and what the likely sentence might be. 
Instructions for both prosecution and defence counsel in determining the 
‘basis of the plea’ (essentially the agreed summary of facts upon which the 
agreement is based and from which the court will sentence) are also outlined 
in section C1 of the Guidelines. Once this basis is determined, the Guidelines 
require that it be signed by all parties and lodged as part of the official court 
records, thereby ensuring the transparency of the charging decision.  
While seeking to control discretion in plea bargaining, the Guidelines offer a 
compromise between flexibility and formal rules, in order to enable a 
seemingly transparent and equitable system that still allows cases to be 
considered according to their individual circumstances. The benefits of this 
type of control are noted by Bibas, who claims that  
even in a world of unlimited resources and sane criminal codes, discretion 
would be essential to doing justice. Justice requires not only rules but also 
fine-grained moral evaluations and distinctions.43
Thus as Watson argues, ‘the plea-bargaining system … in England and Wales 
manages to avoid becoming an American-style pressure cooker by 
comparatively slight reductions in prosecutorial discretion’.
 
44
Although not incorporated in statute, the Guidelines are mandatory 
requirements for prosecutors and are endorsed by the courts as ‘best 
practice’.
 It seeks to 
create a transparent, structured and accepting culture, whereby prosecutors 
use their discretion consistently and in line with the ideals of justice.  
45 This means that, while breaching the Guidelines would not in 
itself result in a case being dismissed, deviation could be a factor influencing 
an Appeal Court in ruling against the Crown.46 As Advisor A (UK) observed, 
‘they are guidelines, but they must be followed’. This system of control, as 
explored by Watson, enables the Guidelines to ‘act as a safeguard against 
unregulated and occluded discussions that eschew fairness for the accused, by 
creating a wholly transparent procedure which stands up to judicial 
scrutiny’.47
                                                 
43 Bibas, above n 32, 370. 
  
44 Watson, above n 34, 78. 
45 Advisor C (UK). 
46 Ibid. 
47 Watson, above n 34, 90. 
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2 Australia 
In contrast, Victoria’s plea bargaining system allows cases to be resolved on 
the basis of unscrutinised prosecutorial decisions, in an unregulated, non-
transparent process. In Victoria, no administrative data are kept, outlining 
when or why plea bargaining occurs or how often discussions result in guilty 
pleas. Importantly, plea bargaining itself is not recognised in, or controlled by, 
any Victorian statute. Thus, not only is the process itself not monitored in any 
statistical or formal sense, but there is also no legal acknowledgement of the 
process. Instead, plea-bargaining falls under the discretionary powers of the 
prosecution, which means that we rely solely upon those who engage in 
discussions to ensure that the process, and resulting agreements, uphold the 
same principles of justice — for example, consistency, accessibility, equality 
and fairness — which apply to more transparent proceedings, such as the trial. 
This is particularly concerning given that agreements can alter the seriousness 
of the conviction and sentence imposed on an accused, and can remove the 
opportunity for the victim to provide testimony or for the prosecution to prove 
its case within the confines of the contested trial and the rules of procedure 
applied within it.48
Within the Victorian Office of Public Prosecutions, three internal policies 
provide some guidance to prosecutors when plea bargaining. For example, 
Prosecutorial Discretion Policy 2 encourages them to initiate discussions with 
the defence practitioner, regardless of whether the defence approaches them, 




The private nature of plea bargaining and the lack of control over this aspect 
of prosecutorial discretion is quite unusual, given the increasing shift in 
Victoria towards greater transparency and control of discretion in proceedings 
that impact on sentencing. For example, we have seen the introduction of 
sections 61 and 208–209 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic), which 
allow judicial sentence indications to operate within both the summary and 
 Significantly, however, OPP internal policies are not legally 
binding and there are no mechanisms in place to monitor whether prosecutors 
adhere to them. For this reason they ultimately impose limited accountability 
or control on the plea bargaining process or the conduct of those involved, and 
they do little to provide the process or its outcomes with any level of public 
legitimacy.  
                                                 
48 Asher Flynn, ‘Non-Transparent Justice and the Plea Bargaining Process in Victoria’ in Marie 
Segrave (ed), Australian and New Zealand Critical Criminology Conference Proceedings 
2009 (Australian and New Zealand Critical Criminology Network, 2009). 
49 Office of Public Prosecutions, Prosecutorial Discretion Policy 2 (at 14 February 2008). 
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indictable criminal jurisdictions. Section 6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991 
(Vic) has also been introduced to clarify the sentence discount applied in 
exchange for an accused person’s guilty plea. The absence of control over 
plea bargaining is also unusual, given the shift towards restricting judicial 
sentencing powers. This shift,  Aas claims, ‘makes the pre-trial decisions, 
where the charges are negotiated, more significant’,50 because the inflexibility 
of set penalties and minimum sentences means that the charging decision has 
a greater impact on the accused person’s likely sentence. This argument 
increases the justification for providing some control over the prosecutorial 
discretion to make alterations to an accused person’s charges initially, 
especially given the Victorian State Government’s proposal to introduce 
mandatory minimum sentences for serious offences.51
V PROBLEMS WITH VICTORIA’S PLEA BARGAINING 
PROCESS 
  
1 Pressures on Accused Persons 
The need to restrict the unscrutinised discretionary powers of the prosecution 
has been a common theme identified in research for several decades. In the 
late 1960s Davis pertinently asked the question: ‘why should the prosecutor’s 
charging decision be immune to review by other officials and immune to 
review by the courts, even though our legal and governmental system 
elsewhere generally assumes the need for checking human frailty?’.52
                                                 
50 Aas, above n 2, 19. 
 When 
interview participants were asked to respond to this same question in the 
context of Victoria’s plea bargaining process, an emerging theme in their 
perspectives was that retaining an absence of control on prosecutorial 
discretion in plea bargaining was necessary, due to the inherent tension that 
exists between flexibility and uniformity. Participants claimed that some 
prosecutorial discretion is required to facilitate reasonable outcomes and to 
51 Galligan, above n 3; Sidney I Lezak and Maureen Leonard, ‘The Prosecutor’s Discretion: 
Out of the Closet-Not Out of Control’, in Carl F Pinkele and William C Louthan (eds), 
Discretion, Justice and Democracy: A Public Policy Perspective (Iowa State University Press, 
1985). See also, The Nationals for Regional Victoria, Coalition Government to Set Minimum 
Sentence Standards for Serious Crime (23 November 2010) <http://www.vicnats. 
com/news/article.a spx?ID=11590>. 
52 Davis, above n 2, 81. 
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consider each case’s individual circumstances - a theme referred to as ‘to turn 
on the facts’,53 or the ‘factual matrix’.54
But a problem arises from this ideal because, without some uniformity, the 
flexible, unscrutinised powers of prosecutors have the potential to be abused, 
or, perhaps more prominently, create a perception of unfairness or abuse, 
which impacts on public confidence in the process.
  
55 As Bibas rightly 
observes, ‘discretion is bad only when it becomes idiosyncratic, 
unaccountable, or opaque’.56
The private nature of the plea bargaining process that currently operates in 
Victoria means that transparent outcomes are seemingly absent. For this 
reason there is a level of attractiveness in ensuring that the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining is transparent and subject to greater 
scrutiny. This is particularly so if this is also likely to alleviate some of the 
main concerns arising from plea bargaining’s non-transparency, such as the 
perceived pressures that exist on both the prosecution and the accused to make 
and accept plea bargaining deals.  
 These are all terms which could be used to 
describe the current system of plea bargaining in Victoria.  
One of plea bargaining’s primary weaknesses is its potential to create 
pressures compelling accused persons to plead guilty. These pressures are 
heightened by the secrecy surrounding plea bargaining in Victoria, because 
there is no scrutiny applied to the process, the prosecutor’s decision, or the 
resulting agreement. As Watson argues, ‘the danger is that an unregulated or 
poorly designed [plea bargaining] system will lead to excessive or otherwise 
improper pressure being applied to the defendant, resulting in an unacceptable 
risk of the innocent pleading guilty’.57
The guilty plea system transforms criminal justice from one which seeks to 
determine whether the State has reliably sustained its burden of proof to 
another which seeks to determine whether the defendant, irrespective of 
guilt or innocence, is able to resist the pressure to plead.
 A similar argument emerged in 
Baldwin and McConville’s analysis of plea bargaining in the UK, prior to the 
implementation of the Guidelines. In this analysis they claimed that: 
58
                                                 
53 Prosecutor H. 
  
54 Defence C. 
55 Flynn, above n 48. 
56 Bibas, above n 32, 372. 
57 Watson, above n 34, 79. 
58 Baldwin and McConville, above n 34, vi. 
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Pleading pressures on the accused can emanate from a multitude of factors, 
including limitations on the availability of Legal Aid funding,59
Some defendants just can’t face the thought of going to a contested hearing 
because of the stress and emotional trauma. More significantly though, most 
can’t afford the cost … so there is a fair bit of pressure on them just to plead 
guilty, especially when it is sweetened with a bargain. 
 or the general 
financial constraints of a trial. These can appear particularly burdensome 
when contrasted with plea bargaining’s benefits: for example, a reduction in 
the severity of the original charges laid. As Defence C explained: 
Pleading pressures can also be increased by the possibly significant reduction 
in the sentence length and type given in exchange for a guilty plea.60 As an 
accused person in Baldwin and McConville’s research claimed, ‘if your 
barrister comes up to you and tells you you’ve got a 50-50 chance that if you 
plead guilty you’ll get off with less than if you plead innocent, well what 
would you do?’61
The defendant obviously has more to lose than the Crown, particularly if it 
may involve a jail term. There is of course a natural pressure because if you 
go on with the trial and lose, there are bigger consequences. If you don’t 
settle you may get an acquittal, but it is unknown. It is a gamble either way, 
and unpredictable. So there is pressure on them to plead. 
 Defence A similarly identified this concern: 
Such pressures are particularly concerning given the number of vulnerable 
people who come before the law.62
There are such a high proportion of people who will go through the system 
who weren’t functioning very well at the time they committed the crime and 
are not functioning any better by the time the case gets to court, and for that 
kind of client, pressure to plead is a real issue. 
 As Advisor B explained: 
Prosecutor H also identified these vulnerabilities, arguing that ‘in the justice 
system, you are often dealing with people who have substance abuse problems 
or psychological or psychiatric problems, or other pressures which they are 
                                                 
59 Asher Flynn, ‘Victoria’s Legal Aid Funding Structure: Hindering the Ideals Inherent to the 
Pre-Trial Process’ (2010) 34 Criminal Law Journal 48; Frank Stephen and Cyrus Tata, 
‘Impact of the Introduction of Fixed Payments into Summary Criminal Legal Aid: Report of 
an Independent Study’ (Report, Scottish Executive, 2007) <http://www.scotland. 
gov.uk/Resource/Doc/180464/0051284.pdf>. 
60 Defence A. See also, Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2)(e). 
61 Baldwin and McConville, above n 34, 26. 
62 Peter Underwood, ‘The Trial Process: Does One Size Fit All?’(2005) 15 Journal of Judicial 
Administration 165.  
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ill-equipped to deal with’. The essence of such concerns is reflected in Mack 
and Roach Anleu’s Australian-based research, which suggested that those 
most likely to plead guilty are indigenous people, and accused persons who 
would ‘not present well in court’.63
When discussing the potential for the unscrutinised plea bargaining process to 
exacerbate pleading pressures, eight Victorian participants (exclusively 
prosecutors) argued that this was unlikely. Prosecutor A stated 
 
an innocent accused is never going to plead guilty. I think the pressure 
probably is on them and that is there to get them to plead early, to get the 
[sentence] discount … but if you are an accused and you are totally 
innocent, you are never going to plead. 
Prosecutor L similarly maintained, ‘we don’t get too many cases of innocent 
people pleading guilty. We don’t’. 
While these participants acknowledged that plea bargaining has the potential 
to place some pressure on an accused person, simply due to the possible 
concessions inherent to such agreements, all eight maintained that this 
pressure was not ‘inappropriate’ (Prosecutor C), even despite plea 
bargaining’s private nature which can work to mask the existence of any 
pressures, or at least create the perception of a mask. As Prosecutor C 
claimed, ‘there is an uncertainty in the whole process … So that uncertainty is 
probably more a factor as to why a defendant might plead, but it is not an 
unreasonable pressure … It is not unreasonable. It is not going to force an 
innocent person to plead’. Following a similar line of argument, Prosecutor H 
explained: 
I have no doubt that defendants would feel, on occasions, a degree of 
pressure when making a pleading decision. But plea bargaining doesn’t 
create unacceptable pressure. I suppose it is a question of whether plea 
bargaining affects a genuine and informed decision being made that is the 
issue. 
Although denying the negative consequences of pleading pressures, in both 
comments the participants refer to either an ‘unreasonable’ or ‘unacceptable’ 
pressure, which demonstrates that they recognise there is some degree of 
pressure applied to accused persons during plea bargaining. However, in their 
                                                 
63 Kathy Mack and Sharyn Roach Anleu, ‘Choice, Consent and Autonomy in a Guilty Plea 
System’ (2000) 17(1) Law in Context 82. See also, Chris Cunneen and Melanie Schwartz, 
‘Funding Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Services: Issues of Equity and Access’ 
(2008) 32(1) Criminal Law Journal 38.  
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opinion, these pressures exist at a ‘reasonable’ and ‘acceptable’ level. These 
claims have a significantly different meaning to a statement indicating that  no 
pressures are applied, and ultimately raise concerns as to how one determines 
when these ‘reasonable’ and ‘appropriate’ pressures become ‘unreasonable’ or 
‘inappropriate’ pressures, particularly given the non-transparent and 
unscrutinised use of plea bargaining by prosecutors in Victoria.  
Of these eight prosecutorial participants, six pointed to legal representation as 
a safeguard for accused persons, as opposed to favouring greater control of 
prosecutorial discretion in line with the UK Guidelines. After all, as Stephen, 
Fazio and Tata maintain, ‘such bargains are not between “efficient 
prosecutors” and defendants, but effectively between prosecutors and 
defendants’ lawyers’.64
The extent to which legal representation alone offers a safeguard to protect 
accused persons from pressures, without the added safeguard of more 
transparent regulations on prosecutorial discretion — such as requiring any 
plea bargaining decisions be reviewed by a superior prosecutor — was, 
however, questioned by six participants (n= 4 Victorian, n=2 UK), including 
Prosecutor S, who claimed: 
 Prosecutor M claimed, ‘it is not in a defence 
solicitor’s interest to have their client plead to something which is either not 
appropriate or against the interests of their client. So I can’t see how 
defendants could feel pressured to plead guilty’. Nine (of 11) defence 
participants also identified legal representation as a factor reducing pleading 
pressures. These views were based largely on the argument expressed by 
Defence E, that ‘the defence provides quality advice about the offer and that 
helps the accused make a principled, informed and appropriate [pleading] 
decision’.  
The obligation is on the defence representatives to make sure, as much as 
they can, that they minimise the pressure on their client and I am sure they 
do that to an extent. But at the end of the day, that client may well be 
looking at the potential difference between going into custody and serving 
an actual term of imprisonment or not, depending on whether or not they 
plead guilty … or it might affect, to a significant extent, the deal they get, so 
the representative can’t really guard against that. 
Prosecutor W (UK) similarly maintained that ‘yes, they feel pressured with 
representation, more so without, but they still feel pressure to plead. If they 
                                                 
64 Frank Stephen, Giorgio Fazio and Cyrus Tata, ‘Incentives, Criminal Defence Lawyers and 
Plea Bargaining’ (2008) 28(3) International Review of Law and Economics 212, 212. 
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are likely to get a good plea offer or have monetary constraints, they just want 
to get it out of the way with as few hearings as possible’.  
Australian and UK research also recognises the possibility that legal 
representation can have limited effect in protecting an accused person against 
pleading pressures and that it can potentially enhance such pressures.65 This is 
due to the obligation on legal representatives to instruct ‘on the strength of the 
prosecution case and the dangers of pursuing a weak defence’,66 which 
Freiberg and Seifman suggest may ‘inadvertently be providing some 
inducement to the accused to plead guilty’.67 Thus, ‘when [a legal 
representative informs] a client they risk a heavier sentence [if they do not 
plead guilty] … defendants are likely to be substantially influenced in 
deciding how to plead’.68 For this reason, a legal representative’s role in 
safeguarding accused persons from pleading pressures can be somewhat 
diminished, particularly when dealing with vulnerable or disadvantaged 
individuals.69
Advisor B similarly argued that legal representation does not safeguard the 
accused by minimising pleading pressures, particularly in Legal Aid cases. He 
claimed that: 
 
Often legal representation is decided on the day of the hearing. So you don’t 
have a lot of meetings with your lawyer necessarily prior to the day … The 
courts take the view that if people are represented that is the ultimate 
safeguard. But when you don’t meet your lawyer until the day of the 
hearing, well I don’t know how good that [protection] is. 
This view is supported by McConville and others, whose observations of 
defence practitioners over 198 weeks in the UK found that ‘solicitors had little 
personal contact with clients, even at court’.70 These problems are 
exacerbated by the fact that guilty pleas are ‘regarded as the highest form of 
proof … [the] equivalent to a conviction after a trial’,71
                                                 
65 Robert D Seifman and Arie Freiburg, ‘Plea Bargaining in Victoria: The Role of Counsel’ 
(2001) 25(2) Criminal Law Journal 64; JUSTICE, Negotiated Justice: A Closer Look at the 
Implications of Plea Bargains (JUSTICE, 1993). 
 which means that 
66 JUSTICE, above n 65, 11. 
67 Freiberg and Seifman, above n 65, 64. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Mack and Roach Anleu, above n 63, 75. 
70 McConville et al, Standing Accused: The Organisation and Practices of Criminal Defence 
Lawyers in Britain (Clarendon Press, 1994) 167. 
71 Mike McConville, ‘Plea Bargaining’, in Mike McConville and Geoffrey Wilson (eds), The 
Handbook of the Criminal Justice Process (Oxford University Press, 2002) 355. 
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‘following the guilty plea, the only concern of the court is to decide upon the 
appropriate sentence’.72 Little, if any, consideration is given to the potential 
pressures that led to the plea. As Skelton and Frank assert, ‘the assumption 
that coercion disappears once there is consent … is dangerous and denies the 
nuances relating to power that are present in all human interactions’.73
The mere perception that plea bargaining’s private nature may contribute to 
pleading pressures, particularly for vulnerable accused persons, constitutes a 
significant justification for ensuring greater transparency and accountability in 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. This could be achieved by 
implementing a more structured and transparent process, and requiring 
reviews of prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining, in the way that the UK 
Guidelines do. As Prosecutor B claimed: 
 
Unduly vulnerable people plead guilty. So there has [sic] to be safeguards 
and checks and balances more than just the legal representation to ensure 
that when a plea is entered based on a plea agreement, it is a true plea and is 
reflective of the defendant’s wish to admit the offence.  
Nineteen Victorian participants supported this justification for implementing 
similar Guidelines in Victoria, on the basis that it would assist in reducing 
misperceptions about plea bargaining, and assist in ensuring greater 
accountability in the process (n=nine defence; n=two judiciary; n=five 
prosecutor; n=three advisors).  
2 Resource Pressures on Prosecutors 
Plea bargaining’s private nature can also exacerbate a perception that 
discussions are used simply to reduce resource expenditure, enhance clearance 
rates and alleviate court backlogs. In most common law systems, prosecutors 
face pressures to uphold public interests and respond to court delays by 
obtaining convictions in a timely manner.74
                                                 
72 Ibid. 
 As a result, workload pressures 
exist which encourage prosecutors to engage in plea bargaining. As 
Prosecutor V (UK) maintained, ‘there is pressure from the courts to resolve 
cases as quickly as we can because it gets it out of the court system’. Defence 
K similarly claimed that, because the benefits of plea bargaining are 
significant,  
73 Ann Skelton and Cheryl Frank, ‘How Does Restorative Justice Address Human Rights and 
Due Process Issues?’ in Howard Zehr and Barb Toews (eds), Critical Issues in Restorative 
Justice (Willan Publishing, 2004) 208. 
74 See, eg, Public Prosecutions Act 1994 (Vic) s 24(C). 
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[s]ometimes there is not necessarily pressure, but there are advantages to the 
prosecution accepting something less than they should because basically it 
cuts down their workload. So if you have prosecutors who are overworked 
they may settle for something, just to clear their books.  
Prosecutor I also stated that in addition to pressures from the courts, internal 
pressures are also applied:  
There is always pressure. Too many cases, not enough resources, budgetary 
cuts from above. It sort of all comes down to can we get through all these 
cases and every now and again someone complains about the [court] 
backlog. There will always be that pressure, as well as the fact that if we 
can get a nice plea bargain, rather than run a two-day trial, there is incentive 
just from a work viewpoint. 
Although identifying these pressures, most participants claimed that the 
pressures were not ‘unreasonable’ (32 out of 37 participants). Prosecutor C 
stated, ‘the pressure on the prosecutor is not that great … There is pressure, 
but it is not unwarranted in any way’. Similarly, Judiciary F identified the 
pressures as ‘appropriate’: 
There are some pressures, but there is not an inappropriate amount of 
pressure, because prosecutors are experienced and competent and know 
where it is appropriate and acceptable to make some form of compromise, 
without sacrificing the justice of the case they are presenting on behalf of 
the community. 
Despite such comments, a concern remains that the absence of control on 
prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining could result in unjust or 
inappropriate outcomes due to efficiency pressures. At the very least, the 
absence of control helps fuel a perception that responding to court 
inefficiency is a primary motivating factor in the Crown’s decision to plea 
bargain. In addition, like the arbitrary distinction made between ‘reasonable’ 
and ‘unreasonable’ pressures on accused persons, similar labels (‘warranted’ 
or ‘appropriate’) were applied to the degree of pressure facing prosecutors. 
These  arbitrary labels further legitimate concerns as to how one determines 
when these pressures move from being ‘warranted’ to ‘unwarranted’, or from 
‘appropriate’ to ‘inappropriate’, given the private nature of plea bargaining 
and the lack of scrutiny or transparency surrounding prosecutorial discretion 
in making charging decisions.  
As a consequence of their non-transparency, there remains the possibility that 
discretionary plea bargaining decisions are based on idiosyncratic reasoning, 
such as a prosecutor’s need to clear workloads. As Bibas maintains, in such 
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situations ‘we rightly fear that justice will vary from prosecutor to prosecutor, 
with each one a law unto himself and his own whims, biases, and shirking’.75
3 The Section C6 Requirements 
 
The need to redress this ‘fear’ thus provides further justification for imposing 
more structured processes and requirements on prosecutorial discretion in plea 
bargaining, in line with the UK Guidelines. 
The overwhelming majority of Victorian participants (29 of 35) responded 
positively to the UK Guidelines, generally on the basis that they are ‘just 
making an informal process visible really’.76
The original section C6 was implemented in response to the Lord Chief 
Justice’s comments in R v Cain,
 However, one section of the 
Guidelines was identified as moving beyond an acceptable level of control by 
significantly regulating and altering prosecutorial pre-trial preparation, while 
also, to some degree, restricting judicial independence in sentencing. These 
concerns relate to section C6 of the Guidelines introduced in June 2007 and 
the amendments to sections C7 and B5 in 2009. These sections are referred to 
as section C6 requirements within this article.  
77 where he criticised the lack of guidance 
presented to sentencing judges by prosecutors. Section C6 therefore obliged 
prosecutors to prepare a Plea and Sentence Document seven days prior to the 
Plea and Case Management Hearing in the Crown Court, regardless of 
whether there was a perceived likelihood of the accused pleading guilty. This 
document required prosecutors to commit to writing: the aggravating and 
mitigating factors; statutory provisions relevant to the accused or the 
offence(s); a Victim Personal Statement(s); evidence of any impact of the 
crime on the community; and applications for orders, such as a confiscation 
order. Prosecutors were then required to use this material to determine a 
qualitative and quantitative sentencing range - for example, a custodial 
sentence between three and five years - which would be acceptable from their 




                                                 
75 Bibas, above n 32, 371. 
76 Defence E. 
77 [2006] EWCA Crim 3233. 
78 Advisor C (UK). 
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According to Advisor C, the official purpose of the section C6 requirements 
is:  
to further enhance the role of the prosecutor in the sentencing process by 
ensuring there is an accurate record of the basis on which a case is brought, 
and that the court has the necessary assistance in sentencing.79
Although the C6 requirements arguably achieve this end, most interview 
participants considered the actual justification of these requirements to be the 
likely pragmatic benefits. If the accused pleaded guilty, the prosecutor could 
address the court immediately and a sentence could be determined without 
adjournment and the risk of any further delay in the finalisation of the case.
 
80
As a result of amendments in 2009, the section C6 requirements were re-
worded to reflect a less compulsory requirement on the prosecution to provide 
information. Thus section C6 now requires the completion of the document 
‘where it is likely to assist the court’; section B5 requires that prosecutors 
‘may offer assistance to the court by making submissions … as to the 
appropriate sentencing range’, and section C7 states that it ‘remains open to 
the prosecutor to provide further [sentencing] information … where he or she 
thought that likely to assist the court, or if the judge requests it’. The use of 
the terms ‘may offer assistance’ and ‘where he or she thought that likely to 
assist the courts’ implies a less restrictive requirement on the prosecutor to 
undertake these tasks. However, when questioned as to the impact of these 
linguistic changes on prosecutorial conduct, Advisor C (UK) maintained that: 
 
Accordingly, participants questioned whether the perceived ‘efficiency’ 
benefits of this mode of control exceeded the potentially negative 
consequences, particularly the possible impact on prosecutorial resource 
expenditure (41 of 46 participants). As Prosecutor L maintained, ‘fortunately 
we in Victoria are not in that UK situation. We don’t have the same 
imperatives or formalised restrictions on us to try and absorb delay to that 
extent’. 
Although the wording might’ve changed, the judges can still request the 
information, and they do. They still expect this information and they expect 
it to be ready early, so really prosecutors will still be expected to have a 
document outlining a sentence range and all relevant sentencing factors 
readily accessible pre-trial. 
                                                 
79 Advisor C. 
80 Ibid. 
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Based on this assessment, despite the ‘voluntariness’ aspect of the amended 
wording, the section C6 requirements still appear to be very much a 
‘requirement’ of the prosecutor in the plea bargaining process. 
VI SIMILAR GUIDELINES IN VICTORIA? 
1 Perceived Limitations of Similar Guidelines 
The section C6 requirements were not supported by any Victorian participant. 
In fact, the majority of Victorian prosecutorial (15 of 19) and defence (eight 
of 11) participants criticised the section C6 requirements for their potential to 
hinder plea bargaining. They believed the shifting of the prosecution’s focus 
towards written advocacy and sentencing at an early stage of the criminal 
justice process is likely to reduce their ability and time to consider early 
resolutions. Prosecutor J claimed that  
once you start to formalise such processes, it has a hampering impact on the 
whole notion of plea bargaining. It extends beyond the prosecutor’s 
historical duty to the public and [the] court, and would in all likelihood 
hinder them from thinking about early resolutions.  
Prosecutor C further stated that: 
The more we seem to generate paperwork, the more we seem to spend on 
the paperwork rather than actually spending time analysing the case and 
trying to assess it. There has been a preoccupation with people having to file 
forms on time, and that’s become the primary focus of everyone, and people 
don’t talk anymore and you can’t resolve things if you don’t talk.  
Another prominent problem surrounding the section C6 requirements, and 
identified by the participants, involved their potential to encroach upon 
judicial independence in sentencing. Judiciary E claimed, ‘it is important that 
prosecutors understand that the court is independent of them, just as we must 
understand that their prosecuting decisions are independent of us’. Prosecutor 
D similarly maintained that: 
It is not our role to provide that information. We can point out the 
authorities and the precedents and even suggest perhaps a rough custodial or 
non-custodial, but that should be it. Otherwise, you run the risk of hindering 
them from making a decision, because they know there will be a basis for a 
Crown appeal if it doesn’t fit.  
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In contrast to these views, two of the four UK prosecutor participants were 
supportive of the ideals behind the section C6 requirements, as Prosecutor T 
(UK) explained: 
Sentencing is complex and a lot of erroneous sentences tend to be made 
which get to the Court of Appeal. To make sure the appropriate sentence is 
then passed, it is right that the prosecutors, with their public interest role, 
play a role in assisting the court to make sure the sentence is right. 
This view was also reflected in the comments of the three UK policy advisors. 
As Advisor A (UK) claimed, ‘in effect, what we are saying is that prosecutors 
always need to stand up to the mark in sentencing, which means they have to 
play a part in the sentencing process’. Similarly, Advisor C (UK) maintained 
that judicial independence is not hindered by a prosecutorial sentencing range 
because ‘it is not determinative. The judge can still make a decision 
independent of their [prosecutor’s] statement’. In addition, Advisor D (UK) 
argued that the prosecutor’s involvement in sentencing is beneficial because it 
provides the judge with a framework to ensure their sentence corresponds 
with mandatory sentencing regulations: 
Prosecutors are not advocating and will never advocate what the sentence 
should be. But what the Guidelines are saying is, on the basis of the 
defendant’s offending, on the basis of x, y and z, the CPS are saying the 
appropriate sentencing range for this is between two and four years …The 
court can say I thank you Mr Prosecutor but I think you are talking a bit of 
rubbish and I am going to sentence him to x. But at least you have tried to 
assist the court in where the range should be …We are also saying that you 
have a responsibility when you stand up as a member of the CPS to make 
sure the court enters a sentence that is good in law. 
Further to the public interest and transparency justifications identified by the 
UK participants, the potential for the section C6 requirements to respond to 
court inefficiency levels, particularly delays in case finalisations, was also 
highlighted as a main benefit. Advisor C (UK) observed: 
If the defendant doesn’t plead guilty, they go to trial and if they get 
convicted, then you will still need it [the document]. And if they do plead 
guilty, you need it and you need it fairly urgently and you will have it. So it 
is not a case of the prosecution going to court and not being able to give the 
required information to the court because they didn’t have time to complete 
it before the hearing. Because of this change, this information will be 
available straight away. 
However, even as a supporter of the ideals behind the section C6 
requirements, Advisor A (UK) acknowledged the potential limitations of 
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preparing a sentence-focused document at such an early stage of the criminal 
justice process. In doing so, Advisor A indicated a potentially significant flaw 
in the effectiveness of the Guidelines to respond to court inefficiency levels: 
This is where the world changes and it is going to increase workloads 
dramatically. I have had so much stick from prosecutors over this because it 
is going to create a lot of additional work and there is a lot of angst about it, 
because it requires prosecutors to prepare a fairly substantial document that 
is only useful for the sentencing process and it will often be prepared before 
any plea discussions take place, [or] the defendant makes a decision to 
plead. 
As is implicit in Advisor A’s (UK) claims, there are potentially quite 
significant resource consequences that arise from requiring that a sentence-
focused document be compiled pre-trial. Preparation of the document requires 
prosecutors to undertake a substantial level of work which is generally not 
completed until after guilt is established at trial or by plea. These concerns 
were also acknowledged by the Victorian participants and two of the UK 
participants who opposed the requirements, with Prosecutor V (UK) 
maintaining,  
there is [sic] already excessive workload pressures on prosecutors here in 
the UK where plea bargaining is very common, because the volume of work 
is so great and we couldn’t get through it unless we resolved cases, and I 
imagine this pressure will only get worse with this.  
Prosecutor G adopted a similar argument, claiming: 
Prosecutors don’t really have time to be completing sentencing information 
before a guilty plea [is entered] so you may find people turn up at the pre-
trial process and not have done all the correct forms and procedures. But 
you can’t really blame them, because they are under other work pressures 
already.  
A related problem identified by participants involved the likely expenditure of 
unnecessary resources, because the case is not guaranteed to be resolved by 
guilty plea or finding. In the period 1 July 2010–30 June 2011, across all 
Crown Courts in England and Wales, over 20 per cent of cases resulted in a 
dismissal or a not guilty verdict.81
                                                 
81 Ministry of Justice, ‘Judicial and Court Statistics 2010’ (Full Report, July 2011) 91 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/statistics-and-data/courts-and-sentencing/ 
judicial-court-stats.pdf>. 
 There is thus a basis for supporting the 
argument that this early use of resources will be unnecessary in just over one-
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fifth of matters. Furthermore, the participants identified that any efficiency 
benefits are only likely to be obtained if the accused pleads guilty at the pre-
trial stage. Given that between 2009 and 2010, late guilty pleas, which are 
pleas entered on or up to two days before the trial, were entered in over 26 per 
cent of cases across all Crown Courts in England and Wales, the likelihood of 
this benefit impacting significantly on court efficiency levels is 
questionable.82 In addition, as two Victorian participants identified, even if a 
guilty plea is entered pre-trial, the benefit of early prosecutorial preparation 
will only arise if the defence also has all plea materials prepared.83
In responding to such criticisms, Advisor C (UK) drew comparisons to a 
similar initiative operating in New Zealand, involving a Sentencing 
Memorandum.
 If they are 
not prepared, the hearing has to be adjourned, regardless of the level of 
preparation undertaken by the prosecutor. 
84
Within s C6 there is a plea and sentence template, which is a one-page 
document. A Sentencing Memorandum is like a book that prosecutors have 
to complete. We think the Plea and Sentence Document will provide 
sufficient assistance to the court, without going down the path of the 
Sentencing Memorandum, which is an excellent document and would be 
great, but we don’t have the capabilities to do it because we are dealing with 
a large volume of crime and it wouldn’t be practical. 
 He argued that, in comparison to the requirements of the 
New Zealand document, the section C6 requirements were a ‘brief and easily 
prepared piece of work’. He explained: 
While there are similarities between the two documents—for example, both 
require the identification of any aggravating factors and, if applicable, any 
sentences imposed on co-offenders—there is a significant difference between 
them. The Sentencing Memorandum is completed only after a guilty plea or 
finding is returned, and must be filed with the court two days prior to the 
sentencing hearing, not during the pre-trial process. Comparisons between the 
documents can therefore be made based only on their content, not the timing 
or resource expenditure, as implied by Advisor C (UK). Advisor C’s 
comments thus achieve little in the way of minimising the concerns 
surrounding the unnecessary early expenditure of prosecutorial resources, and 
they do not provide much justification for Victoria implementing like 
Guidelines.   
                                                 
82 Ibid 107. Late guilty pleas were the reason for 63 per cent of the cracked cases across all 
Crown Courts in England and Wales between 2009 and 2010. 
83 Defence F; Prosecutor J. 
84 Sentencing Practice Note 2003 (NZ) s 2. 
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In addition to the potential resource implications, Victorian participants raised 
doubts over the accuracy of a sentence-focused document prepared pre-trial. 
Interestingly, this issue was not identified by the UK participants opposed to 
the requirements, nor was it considered a significant limitation by those in 
support of the requirements. As Advisor D (UK) claimed, ‘that is not really of 
great concern, because it can be fixed later’. When questioned about the 
impact of an inaccurate document being presented to the judge, Advisor D 
(UK) maintained that, ‘the judge can make a valuation of whether the 
document is reflective or not, and the document can also be changed before 
the actual hearing’. Upon further questioning about the resource implications 
of prosecutors having to make last-minute changes to ensure the document’s 
accuracy, he claimed ‘well, it’s still not that damaging’, and relied heavily on 
the argument that the prosecutor’s recommendations were not a mandatory 
restriction on the judge’s ultimate sentencing decision, so their ‘impact can be 
minimal’. This is an interesting statement, given that it could be interpreted to 
mean that the purpose for introducing the section C6 requirements originally 
(to allow a sentence to be imposed at the pre-trial hearing immediately after a 
guilty plea is entered) becomes somewhat superfluous, and it highlights yet 
another prominent limitation of this section of the Guidelines. 
The accuracy of a sentence-focused document prepared pre-trial was a strong 
concern for Victorian participants, and especially its accuracy in relation to 
accused persons. This was because many of their personal mitigating and 
aggravating factors, including their circumstances at the time of offending, 
their psychiatric or intellectual problems, their drug addictions, their future 
prospects and their ‘response to the offence and prosecution (eg remorse, acts 
of reparation)’85 may be unknown to the Crown at an early stage. This is 
particularly significant in light of a recent UK study, which found that 
personal mitigating and aggravating factors are prominent considerations for 
judges prior to determining a sentence — so much so that not only can they 
impact on sentence length, but they are also a key factor considered in 
deciding between a custodial or non-custodial sanction.86 For example, if at 
the plea hearing the accused person failed to address the problems that had led 
to their criminal behaviour, such as drug or gambling addictions, they were 
more likely to receive a custodial sanction than a non-custodial sanction.87
                                                 
85 Jessica Jacobson and Mike Hough, ‘Personal Mitigation’ (2008) 35 The Barrister 10. See 
also Joanna Shapland, Between Conviction and Sentence: The Process of Mitigation 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981). 
 If 
this logic is then applied to the section C6 requirements, in the absence of this 
86 Jessica Jacobson and Mike Hough, Mitigation: The Role of Personal Factors in Sentencing 
(Prison Reform Trust, 2007) 12. 
87 Ibid 40. 
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information, any prosecutorial sentence recommendation made to the court is 
likely to be inaccurate both in type and quantum, raising issues of fairness and 
questions about the ability of the section C6 requirements to facilitate ‘just’ 
outcomes.  
Further to questions about accuracy, Prosecutor M challenged the relevance of 
material compiled pre-trial, claiming that such information could change 
significantly:  
When the document is first written, a matter in mitigation might be that the 
offender was receiving counselling, was living at home with his family, was 
meaningfully employed and in a stable relationship. But by the time the 
sentencing comes along, the offender is no longer living at home, no longer 
in the relationship, no longer working, not receiving counselling, using 
alcohol and drugs and committing further offences. Those matters are 
extremely significant and can make a massive difference to the sentence. 
As these comments demonstrate, it is probable that any information collated 
on an accused person’s personal circumstances would require amendment at a 
date later than that of its original compilation. In light of this, it is likely that 
prosecutors would need additional time to review the material before using it 
as a basis for their sentencing recommendations. Thus, many of the already 
minimal resource benefits acquired by completing it at an early stage will be 
lost.  
2 Increased Control on Prosecutorial Discretion 
Aside from the limitations identified by participants relating to the section C6 
requirements, when discussing whether implementing like guidelines in 
Victoria was necessary to combat the possible perceptions of pleading and 
resource pressures on accused persons and prosecutors, a strong degree of 
resistance emerged in the responses of one defence practitioner and two 
prosecutors. One of the prosecutors requested ‘no more formality … we have 
good enough judgement to enter into negotiations when we want to and we 
don’t need any more formality’.88
The key argument against formalisation identified by the Victorian 
participants was also a main concern identified by the two UK participants 
opposed to the section C6 requirements. They considered that control hinders 
 Similarly, Defence B claimed 
‘formalisation is cumbersome. We don’t have to police every person in 
authority and reduce everything to a mechanical process’.  
                                                 
88 Prosecutor G. 
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flexibility and infringes on appropriate and necessary discretionary powers. 
Prosecutor A claimed, ‘if you formalise it too much it would be difficult for 
us, because every case is so different. It is a very intuitive thing too because 
you have so many things and people to consider. It can’t be just a black and 
white process’. Restricting flexibility through greater control on prosecutorial 
discretion was further criticised on the basis that it may impact on the 
confidentiality of discussions. Prosecutor E claimed: 
Really in a lot of plea bargaining, the discussion part is not intended in any 
sense to bind the parties. It is only the final agreement that is binding. It is 
an odd thing if in, say, a murder case you have somebody who offers to 
plead guilty to manslaughter, but the Crown rejects it, and then they run the 
case at the trial on the basis that they didn’t do it. So you can’t have 
anything that is too formal. 
Prosecutor W (UK) further maintained that: 
If we are going to have plea bargaining … it has got to be as informal as 
possible and it has to be done at a level where it can be confidential, so if it 
falls over, nobody is embarrassed by it, nobody feels constrained or 
restrained from being involved in those processes in the future.  
Greater control of discretion, however, does not automatically involve 
revoking prosecutorial powers, nor does it require the revelation of the content 
of discussions, or that they be conducted in open court. Instead, as evidenced 
by the Guidelines, it can offer a compromise between uniformity and 
flexibility, whereby discretion is monitored within the parameters of legal 
principles and due process; ‘in moderation, judicious discretion promotes 
justice’.89
exercised simultaneously and may only be mutually indistinguishable in the 
abstract … In this way, what, in the abstract, we may term rules and 
discretion, should not be counterposed as opposites ... Rules and discretion 
are better understood as fluid, unstable and synergistic, rather than as 
distinct entities locked in mutual opposition.
 This ideal fits within Tata’s analysis of the craftwork of sentencing 
in the UK, where he argues that rules and discretion can be 
90
This type of control, which seeks to incorporate the operation of discretion 
and rules within a mutually constructive environment, would also be likely to 
  
                                                 
89 Bibas, above n 32, 371. 
90 Tata, above n 7, 429–31. 
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offer benefits that increase public awareness and understanding of plea 
bargaining, and reduce misperceptions of discussions.91
What is troubling about prosecutorial discretion is not that it places 
discretionary power in the hands of individuals. What is troubling is that it 
is very often ad hoc, hidden, and insulated from public scrutiny and 
criticism. Many discretionary decisions require no reasoned justification. 
These decisions risk being inconsistent, biased, and tainted by agency costs 
that pull them far from the public's shared moral sense.
 As Bibas observes: 
92
The most effective way to avoid idiosyncratic reasons affecting discretionary 
decisions is to develop a culture and structure whereby prosecutors use their 
discretion consistently and in line with the ideals of justice. This is 
demonstrated by Miller and Wright’s examination of prosecutorial 
discretionary charging decisions in New Orleans in the United States, which 
found consistent patterns of behaviour within the prosecutor’s office, so that 
even their discretionary decisions appeared to follow an ‘office common law’, 
and similar cases were treated alike by different prosecutors.
 
93
The recorded reasons show the influence of substantive and procedural legal 
doctrines, the policy priorities of supervisors, and the evidentiary hurdles of 
proving criminal charges — all sources that one would expect to dominate 
in a system that respects the rule of law. Moreover, these patterned reasons 
reflect something more than individual prosecutors predicting legal 
outcomes and operating in the shadow of the law: they show prosecutors 
responding to social norms and living up to group expectations about what 
it means to be a prosecutor in that particular office.
 In fact, Miller 
and Wright claim that: 
94
Although, in this case, the culture was facilitated by an unwritten ‘office 
common law’, this type of culture would be further facilitated, and, 
importantly, transparent to the public, through the development of formal 
guidelines and policies, in line with the UK Guidelines.   
 
                                                 
91 Anthony Doob and Julian Roberts, Sentencing: An Analysis of the Public’s View of 
Sentencing (Department of Justice, 1983); Arie Freiberg, ‘The Four Pillars of Justice: A 
Review Essay’ (2003) 36(2) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 223; David 
Indermaur, ‘Public Perception of Sentencing in Perth, Western Australia’ (1987) 20(3) 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 163. 
92 Bibas, above n 32, 373. 
93 Marc L Miller and Ronald F Wright, ‘The Black Box’ (2008) (94) Iowa Law Review 125, 
129. 
94 Ibid 131. 
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Flynn argues that ‘if one supports the ideal that justice needs to be seen to be 
done, or at the very least, have some degree of openness, then this must be 
applied consistently to all criminal justice processes … [including] plea 
bargaining’.95
We could probably be a bit more systematised in line with the Guidelines so 
we had a bit more of an idea of what we are doing and then the public might 
view it as being more accountable. I do think we are in a position now 
where the degree of public accountability is probably greater than it has 
ever been in the past, so perhaps plea bargaining should be more 
systematised in that regard. 
 On this basis, there was majority support among the Victorian 
interview participants for a more transparent plea bargaining process in 
Victoria that facilitates greater public awareness and access to prosecutorial 
charging decisions, albeit a support tempered by concerns about how well a 
non-legally educated audience would understand plea bargaining (33 out of 42 
participants). As Prosecutor A argued, it ‘should be totally transparent to the 
public. The public should definitely be informed of what goes on with 
negotiations. How much they understand may be difficult to establish, but we 
should definitely try to be open and transparent to them’. Prosecutor O 
similarly asserted that ‘transparency, so far as you can be [transparent], is 
important. We are working for the public after all’. Prosecutor E further 
supported this view, claiming: 
The benefits of implementing a more transparent and structured process that 
offers scrutiny of the decision-making powers of prosecutors are also 
identified by Bibas, who argues that ‘the mere fear of review would discipline 
outliers without preventing justifiable deviation. In other words, just decisions 
can and should bubble up from below, so long as higher-ups are there to 
review and harmonize them, to check for outliers’.96
VII CONCLUSION 
 Therefore, not only are 
any idiosyncratic discretionary decisions scrutinised, but the perception that 
discretionary decisions will be reviewed by a superior prosecutor will help 
control prosecutorial conduct and create a culture that is more supportive of 
transparent and accountable prosecutorial decision-making.   
Despite some criticisms of the Guidelines identified (mainly) by the Victorian 
participants, the adoption of a similar transparent framework in Victoria could 
have the potential for rendering plea bargaining visible and accountable, and 
                                                 
95 Flynn, above n 48, 96. 
96 Bibas, above n 32, 375. 
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could assist in minimising some of the significant issues arising from its 
private nature. In particular, it could assist in alleviating perceptions that 
workload, resource and efficiency pressures are the main motivating factors 
for prosecutors entering into and accepting plea deals, by providing a level of 
scrutiny of these decisions. This also has the benefit of, if not alleviating some 
pleading pressures on accused persons, at least making these pressures more 
evident.  
The main argument identified by those Victorian and UK participants opposed 
to greater controls on prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining related to the 
inherent tension between flexibility and uniformity. In this regard, participants 
felt that in order to facilitate reasonable outcomes and consider each case’s 
individual circumstances, prosecutorial discretion was required. However, 
without some uniformity, the flexible discretionary powers of prosecutors 
could potentially be abused, resulting in the unequal or unfair treatment of 
accused persons, or, at the very minimum, creating public perceptions of 
abuse and hidden justice. Discretion is an important component of the 
prosecutor’s role. However it can be controlled without the control becoming 
unduly restrictive or inflexible. This can be achieved by implementing 
controls in line with the UK Guidelines, which seek to monitor discretion 
within the parameters of legal principle and due process by officially 
recognising plea bargaining, and directing and reviewing prosecutorial 
conduct. This shift would allow prosecutors to maintain a degree of 
flexibility, while also rendering their decisions more transparent. Such a move 
is also likely to reduce public misperceptions about, and misunderstanding of, 
plea bargaining.97
While this article has identified some potentially significant limitations of the 
UK Guidelines, particularly the possibility for the section C6 requirements to 
encroach upon judicial independence and squander prosecutorial resources, it 
has also provided strong justifications for imposing greater accountability on 
prosecutors in the exercise of their discretion in Victoria. As it currently 
operates, Victoria’s plea bargaining process is surrounded by perceptions of 
inappropriateness and misconduct, which are largely a consequence of its 
private nature and the lack of public accountability and of transparency in the 
process. But to control prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining in a way 
similar to that achieved through the Guidelines (albeit without the inclusion of 
the section C6 requirements) would be beneficial. It would provide a 
mechanism for ensuring that discussions undergo the same scrutiny and and 
have the same transparency as other criminal justice processes, such as the 
 
                                                 
97 Bibas, above n 32; Roberts, above n 2. 
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trial. Furthermore, by providing a structured outline of the plea bargaining 
process and requirements in a legally binding policy, it would significantly 
reduce the potential for individualised, idiosyncratic reasons to influence 
prosecutorial discretion and would help create a legal culture that supports 
and adheres to transparent decision-making. This would be likely to promote 
just outcomes and enhance the transparency of the delivery of modern, 
efficient justice. 
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APPENDIX 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON 
THE ACCEPTANCE OF PLEAS (REVISED 
2009)  
A: FOREWORD 
A1. Prosecutors have an important role in protecting the victim’s interests in 
the criminal justice process, not least in the acceptance of pleas and the 
sentencing exercise. The basis of plea, particularly in a case that is not 
contested, is the vehicle through which the victim's voice is heard. Factual 
inaccuracies in pleas in mitigation cause distress and offence to victims, the 
families of victims and witnesses. This can take many forms but may be most 
acutely felt when the victim is dead and the family hears inaccurate assertions 
about the victim's character or lifestyle. Prosecution advocates are reminded 
that they are required to adhere to the standards set out in the Victim's 
Charter, which places the needs of the victim at the heart of the criminal 
justice process, and that they are subject to a similar obligation in respect of 
the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime. 
A2. The principle of fairness is central to the administration of justice. The 
implementation of Human Rights Act 1998 in October 2000 incorporated into 
domestic law the principle of fairness to the accused articulated in the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Accuracy and reasonableness of plea 
plays an important part in ensuring fairness both to the accused and to the 
victim. 
A3. The Attorney General's Guidelines on the Acceptance of Pleas issued on 
December 7, 2000 highlighted the importance of transparency in the conduct 
of justice. The basis of plea agreed by the parties in a criminal trial is central 
to the sentencing process. An illogical or unsupported basis of plea can lead to 
an unduly lenient sentence being passed, and has a consequential effect where 
consideration arises as to whether to refer the sentence to the Court of Appeal 
under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. 
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A4. These Guidelines, which replace the Guidelines issued in October 2005, 
give guidance on how prosecutors should meet these objectives of protection 
of victims' interests and of securing fairness and transparency in the process. 
They take into account paragraphs IV.45.4 and following of the Consolidated 
Criminal Practice Direction, amended May 2009 and the guidance issued by 
the Court of Appeal (Criminal) Division in R v Beswick [1996] 1 Cr.App.R. 
343, R v Tolera [1999] 1 Copyright App R 25 and R v Underwood [2005] 1 
Copyright App R 178. They complement the Bar Council Guidance on 
Written Standards for the Conduct of Professional Work issued with the 7th 
edition of the Code of Conduct for the Bar of England and Wales and the Law 
Society's Professional Conduct Rules. When considering the acceptance of a 
guilty plea prosecution advocates are also reminded of the need to apply the 
Farquharson Guidelines on the Role and Responsibilities of the Prosecution 
Advocate. 
A5. The Guidelines should be followed by all prosecutors and those persons 
designated under section 7 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 
(designated caseworkers) and apply to prosecutions conducted in England and 
Wales. 
B: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
B1. Justice in this jurisdiction, save in the most exceptional circumstances, is 
conducted in public. This includes the acceptance of pleas by the prosecution 
and sentencing. 
B2. The Code for Crown Prosecutors governs the prosecutor's decision-
making prior to the commencement of the trial hearing and sets out the 
circumstances in which pleas to a reduced number of charges, or less serious 
charges, can be accepted. 
B3. When a case is listed for trial and the prosecution form the view that the 
appropriate course is to accept a plea before the proceedings commence or 
continue, or to offer no evidence on the indictment or any part of it, the 
prosecution should whenever practicable speak to the victim or the victim's 
family, so that the position can be explained. The views of the victim or the 
family may assist in informing the prosecutor's decision as to whether it is the 
public interest, as defined by the Code for Crown Prosecutors, to accept or 
reject the plea. The victim or victim’s family should then be kept informed 
and decisions explained once they are made at court. 
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B4. The appropriate disposal of a criminal case after conviction is as much a 
part of the criminal justice process as the trial of guilt or innocence. The 
prosecution advocate represents the public interest, and should be ready to 
assist the court to reach its decision as to the appropriate sentence. This will 
include drawing the court's attention to: 
Any victim personal statement or other information available to the 
prosecution advocate as to the impact of the offence on the victim;  
Where appropriate, to any evidence of the impact of the offending on a 
community; 
Any statutory provisions relevant to the offender and the offences under 
consideration; 
Any relevant sentencing guidelines and guideline cases; and 
The aggravating and mitigating factors of the offence under consideration. 
B5. The prosecution advocate may also offer assistance to the court by 
making submissions, in the light of all these factors, as to the appropriate 
sentencing range. In all cases, it is the prosecution advocate’s duty to apply 
for appropriate ancillary orders, such as anti-social behaviour orders and 
confiscation orders. When considering which ancillary orders to apply for, 
prosecution advocates must always have regard to the victim’s needs, 
including the question of his or her future protection. 
C: THE BASIS OF PLEA 
C1. The basis of a guilty plea must not be agreed on a misleading or untrue set 
of facts and must take proper account of the victim’s interests. An illogical or 
insupportable basis of plea will inevitably result in the imposition of an 
inappropriate sentence and is capable of damaging public confidence in the 
criminal justice system. In cases involving multiple defendants the bases of 
plea for each defendant must be factually consistent with each other. 
C2. When the defendant indicates an acceptable plea, the defence advocate 
should reduce the basis of the plea to writing. This must be done in all cases 
save for those in which the defendant has indicated that the guilty plea has 
been or will be tendered on the basis of the prosecution case. 
C3. The written basis of plea must be considered with great care, taking 
account of the position of any other relevant defendant where appropriate. The 
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prosecution should not lend itself to any agreement whereby a case is 
presented to the sentencing judge on a misleading or untrue set of facts or on a 
basis that is detrimental to the victim's interests. There will be cases where a 
defendant seeks to mitigate on the basis of assertions of fact which are outside 
the scope of the prosecution's knowledge. A typical example concerns the 
defendant’s state of mind. If a defendant wishes to be sentenced on this basis, 
the prosecution advocate should invite the judge not to accept the defendant's 
version unless he or she gives evidence on oath to be tested in cross-
examination. Paragraph IV.45.14 of the Consolidated Criminal Practice 
Direction states that in such circumstances the defence advocate should be 
prepared to call the defendant and, if the defendant is not willing to testify, 
subject to any explanation that may be given, the judge may draw such 
inferences as appear appropriate. 
C4. The prosecution advocate should show the prosecuting authority any 
written record relating to the plea and agree with them the basis on which the 
case will be opened to the court. If, as may well be the case, the basis of plea 
differs in its implications for sentencing or the making of ancillary orders 
from the case originally outlined by the prosecution, the prosecution advocate 
must ensure that such differences are accurately reflected in the written record 
prior to showing it to the prosecuting authority. 
C5. It is the responsibility of the prosecution advocate thereafter to ensure that 
the defence advocate is aware of the basis on which the plea is accepted by 
the prosecution and the way in which the prosecution case will be opened to 
the court. 
C6. In all cases where it is likely to assist the court where the sentencing 
issues are complex or unfamiliar the prosecution must add to the written 
outline of the case which is served upon the court a summary of the key 
considerations. This should take the form of very brief notes on: 
Any relevant statutory limitations 
The names of any relevant sentencing authorities or guidelines 
the scope for any ancillary orders (e.g. concerning anti-social behaviour, 
confiscation or deportation will need to be considered. 
The outline should also include the age of the defendant and information 
regarding any outstanding offences. 
C7. It remains open to the prosecutor to provide further written information 
(for example to supplement and update the analysis at later stages of the case) 
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where he or she thought that likely to assist the court, or if the judge requests 
it. 
C8. When the prosecution advocate has agreed the written basis of plea 
submitted by the defence advocate, he or she should endorse the document 
accordingly. If the prosecution advocate takes issue with all or part of the 
written basis of plea, the procedure set out in the Consolidated Criminal 
Practice Direction (and in Part 37.10(5) of the Criminal Procedure Rules) 
should be followed. The defendant's basis of plea must be set out in writing 
identifying what is in dispute; the court may invite the parties to make 
representations about whether the dispute is material to sentence; and if the 
court decides that it is a material dispute, the court will invite further 
representations or evidence as it may require and decide the dispute in 
accordance with the principles set out in R v Newton, 77 Cr.App.R.13, CA. 
The signed original document setting out the disputed factual matters should 
be made available to the trial judge and thereafter lodged with the court 
papers, as it will form part of the record of the hearing. 
C9. Where the basis of plea cannot be agreed and the discrepancy between the 
two accounts is such as to have a potentially significant effect on the level of 
sentence, it is the duty of the defence advocate so to inform the court before 
the sentencing process begins. There remains an overriding duty on the 
prosecution advocate to ensure that the sentencing judge is made aware of the 
discrepancy and of the consideration which must be given to holding a 
Newton hearing to resolve the issue. The court should be told where a 
derogatory reference to a victim, witness or third party is not accepted, even 
though there may be no effect on sentence. 
C10. As emphasised in paragraph IV.45.10 of the Consolidated Criminal 
Practice Direction, whenever an agreement as to the basis of plea is made 
between the prosecution and defence, any such agreement will be subject to 
the approval of the trial judge, who may of his or her own motion disregard 
the agreement and direct that a Newton hearing should be held to determine 
the proper basis on which sentence should be passed. 
C11. Where a defendant declines to admit an offence that he or she previously 
indicated should be taken into consideration, the prosecution advocate should 
indicate to the defence advocate and the court that, subject to further review, 
the offence may now form the basis of a new prosecution. 
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D: SENTENCE INDICATIONS 
D1. Only in the Crown Court may sentence indications be sought. Advocates 
there are reminded that indications as to sentence should not be sought from 
the trial judge unless issues between the prosecution and defence have been 
addressed and resolved. Therefore, in difficult or complicated cases, no less 
than seven days notice in writing of an intention to seek an indication should 
normally be given to the prosecution and the court. When deciding whether 
the circumstances of a case require such notice to be given, defence advocates 
are reminded that prosecutors should not agree a basis of plea unless and until 
the necessary consultation has taken place first with the victim and/or the 
victim's family and second, in the case of an independent prosecution 
advocate, with the prosecuting authority.  
D2. If there is no final agreement about the plea to the indictment, or the basis 
of plea, and the defence nevertheless proceeds to seek an indication of 
sentence, which the judge appears minded to give, the prosecution advocate 
should remind him or her of the guidance given in R v Goodyear (Karl) 
[2005] EWCA 888 that normally speaking an indication of sentence should 
not be given until the basis of the plea has been agreed or the judge has 
concluded that he or she can properly deal with the case without the need for a 
trial of the issue. 
D3. If an indication is sought, the prosecution advocate should normally 
enquire whether the judge is in possession of or has access to all the evidence 
relied on by the prosecution, including any victim personal statement, as well 
as any information about relevant previous convictions recorded against the 
defendant.  
D4. Before the judge gives the indication, the prosecution advocate should 
draw the judge's attention to any minimum or mandatory statutory sentencing 
requirements. Where the prosecution advocate would be expected to offer the 
judge assistance with relevant guideline cases or the views of the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council, he or she should invite the judge to allow them to do so. 
Where it applies, the prosecution advocate should remind the judge that the 
position of the Attorney General to refer any sentencing decision as unduly 
lenient is unaffected. In any event, the prosecution advocate should not say 
anything which may create the impression that the sentence indication has the 
support or approval of the Crown. 
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E: PLEAS IN MITIGATION 
E1. The prosecution advocate must challenge any assertion by the defence in 
mitigation which is derogatory to a person's character, (for instance, because it 
suggests that his or her conduct is or has been criminal, immoral or improper) 
and which is either false or irrelevant to proper sentencing considerations. If 
the defence advocate persists in that assertion, the prosecution advocate 
should invite the court to consider holding a Newton hearing to determine the 
issue. 
E2. The defence advocate must not submit in mitigation anything that is 
derogatory to a person's character without giving advance notice in writing so 
as to afford the prosecution advocate the opportunity to consider their position 
under paragraph E1. When the prosecution advocate is so notified they must 
take all reasonable steps to establish whether the assertions are true. 
Reasonable steps will include seeking the views of the victim. This will 
involve seeking the views of the victim's family if the victim is deceased, and 
the victim's parents or legal guardian where the victim is a child. Reasonable 
steps may also include seeking the views of the police or other law 
enforcement authority, as appropriate. An assertion which is derogatory to a 
person’s character will rarely amount to mitigation unless it has a causal 
connection to the circumstances of the offence or is otherwise relevant to 
proper sentencing considerations. 
E3. Where notice has not been given in accordance with paragraph E2, the 
prosecution advocate must not acquiesce in permitting mitigation which is 
derogatory to a person’s character. In such circumstances, the prosecution 
advocate should draw the attention of the court to the failure to give advance 
notice and seek time, and if necessary, an adjournment to investigate the 
assertion in the same way as if proper notice had been given. Where, in the 
opinion of the prosecution advocate, there are substantial grounds for 
believing that such an assertion is false or irrelevant to sentence, he or she 
should inform the court of their opinion and invite the court to consider 
making an order under section 58(8) of the Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996, preventing publication of the assertion. 
E4. Where the prosecution advocate considers that the assertion is, if true, 
relevant to sentence, or the court has so indicated, he or she should seek time, 
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and if necessary an adjournment, to establish whether the assertion is true. If 
the matter cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of the parties, the prosecution 
advocate should invite the court to consider holding a Newton hearing to 
determine the issue. 
Her Majesty's Attorney General 
[Issued 5 November to take effect 1 December 2009] 
 
